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In recent years, due to the remarkable development of science and technology, products with var-
ious functions that could not be realized until then have been developed and manufactured, and are
widely sold all over the world. It is the functional materials that utilize the characteristics of materials
such as semiconductors, magnetic materials, and optical glass that determine the functions of such
products. However, recently, product accidents caused by raw materials and parts have frequently
occurred due to the occurrence of defects (silent changes) due to unintended changes in materials at
the manufacturing stage, damage/fracture of materials, and deterioration over time. These things can
upset the production and sales plans of products at the manufacturer, and can have a great impact
organizational management such as profit decline and opportunity loss. Therefore, it is important to
carry out risk management related to material changes and failure mode analysis related to materials
by front loading from the concept design stages of products to prevent them. Therefore, in this study,
we propose the failure mode analysis (risk assessment) methods ”modified DRBFM” and ”design
deviation method” for materials.
The modified DRBFM is a method that extends the logic of DRBFM by introducing the concept
of restriction specifications in risk assessment into DRBFM, which is widely used as a method for
preventing quality, safety and reliability problems. The modified DRBFM makes it possible to effec-
tively derive the correspondence between design changes/environmental changes and damage/fracture
mechanisms of materials. The modified DRBFM is applied to the failure mode analysis comparison
exercise (FMEA and modified DRBFM) for the objective lens of the virtual laser optical system, we
verified whether the failure mode could be extracted effectively for effectiveness of modified DRBFM.
The design deviation method (DDM) is the failure mode/risk evaluation method for materials that
can deal with the problems clarified through the verification of the modified DRBFM. For the DDM,
”set the deviation patterns of design deviation in the restriction specifications”, ”correspond the devi-
ation patterns of the stress/strength parameters in the design deviation patterns and the stress-strength
model (SSM) by the correspondence table”, ” It consists of the procedure of ”deriving the dam-
age/fracture modes of materials from the SSM deviation patterns and deriving it as the failure mech-
anisms of the functions”. The DDM can logically derive the failure modes due to damage/fracture of
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materials from the expected changes in the restriction specifications. The DDM is applied to failure
mode analysis comparison exercises (FMEA, DRBFM, DDM) for a virtual laser treatment system.
The effectiveness of DDM was verified whether the damage/fracture mechanisms and failure modes
caused by material properties could be effectively extracted.
In addition, in the failure modes based on damage/fracture of materials, there is a possibility that
the results may change depending on the knowledge of the failure mode analysts such as material
strength, and problems in due to selection mistakes etc. In order to solve this problem, we will
construct a method to determine the validity of the derived damage/fracture modes by analyzing the
similarity between the correspondence table prepared in advance and the input result of the failure
mode analysts. Specifically, we focus on the fact that the design deviation/SSM deviation of the de-
sign deviation method can be expressed by a sparse matrix, and combine the DDM and the Support
Vector Machine (SVM) of the machine learning method. The validity of the discriminant analysis
results was considered by applying the failure mode discriminant analysis method using SVM to the
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Fig. 1.3 Risk definition































Table 1.1 Example of safety-related laws and regulations in each country
Country name Legal regulation Jurisdiction
Electrical appliance material safety law Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
Japan Consumer product safety act Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
Product liability law Cabinet Office
Federal law governing consumer products Consumer Product Safety
Commission（CPSC）
USA Federal law that regulates products Occupational Safety and Health
(including machinery) used in offices Administration (OSHA)
Product liability law By state and region
Low voltage directive European Commission
EU Machinary directive European Commission
General product safety directive European Commission
Fig. 1.5 Concept of risk communication
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Fig. 1.6 Flow of risk assessment and risk reduction
Fig. 1.7 Examples of risk assessment indicators (risk matrix)
次にリスク低減方策の詳細について述べる．リスク低減方策 [13, 14]は 3ステップメソッ
ドとも呼ばれ，「1.本質的安全設計方策，2.安全防護・追加の方策，3.使用上の情報」の 3
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1.3.2 FMEA（Failure Mode and Effect Analysis）








また FMEAには，FMEAの概念を論理的に拡張した FMECA（Failure Mode Effect and






1.3.3 FTA（Fault Tree Analysis）








Fig. 1.8 Implementation example of FTA
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1.3.4 HAZOP（Hazard and Operability Study）
HAZOP（ハザード・運転性解析）[22, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57]は，化学プラン
ト等の大規模（複雑な）システムに於ける潜在的危険や運転上の問題点について，起こ
り得るプロセス異常（正常状態からの偏差）としてガイドワード（No, Less, More, Reverse,






1.3.5 STAMP/STPA（System Theoretic Accident Model and Processes/System
Theoretic Process Analysis）
STAMP/STPA（システム理論に基づく事故モデル及びプロセス/システム理論的プロセ

















1.3.6 DRBFM（Design Review Based on Failure Mode）


























• 課題 1. 従来故障モード解析手法の論理を拡張し，材料に関する故障モード解析に
適用できる故障モード解析手法が構築されていない
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Table 1.2 Confusion matrix in machine learning
1.4.2 サポートベクターマシン（Support Vector Machine）

















ス判別を多クラス判別に拡張した 1対 1手法を用いている [74]．表 1.3は，1対 1手法を用
いた多クラス判別分析結果の例を示している．クラスを「○（F(x)=1）・△（F(x)=2）・□
(F(x)=3)」の 3種類，判別基準として「△のクラスを F(x)と判別する SVMモデルの数」と
した場合，「3クラスの組合せから構築した SVMモデル（6個）の判別値を数え，数えた
結果（F(x)）を比較（多数決）」し，最も SVMモデルの数の多い△が判別結果として出力
される．尚，本研究では SVM関数として，統計解析言語 R3.4.2の e1071パッケージに実
装された LIBSVM（台湾大学にて開発された SVMライブラリのこと）を用いる．
Fig. 1.10 Concept of SVM
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Table 1.3 Kind of kernel functions of SVM
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モード解析手法の差異や提案手法の意義を示し，本研究の独自性を主張する．
故障モード解析やリスクアセスメントに関する研究として，次に示すものがある．故
障モードを自動的に同定する，形式表現や SysML（Systems Modeling Language）を用いた
手法 [82, 83, 84]，不具合事象の次元解析 [85]，故障確率の推定 [86]やHAZOPを援用した



















































































































































































































































はできない [59, 60, 61]．他の研究では，正式表現と SysMLを使用して故障モードを自動
的に特定している [24, 25, 62]．それらは材料の損傷/破壊メカニズムとは関係が無い為，
材料の損傷/破壊によって引き起こされる故障モードを論理的に決定することはできない．
FTAに於いても，上部の故障現象から特定の損傷/破壊材料モデルを取得するための論理
CHAPTER 2. 材料に関する故障モード解析を可能とする「修正DRBFM」の提案 32
的な手順は確立されていない．物理量の異常な変化を想定した故障木の開発を支援する
故障イベントの次元分析も提案された．提案された方法は，故障木の物理的一貫性を検







FMECA[22, 35, 102]は，FMEAの概念を論理的に拡張するもう 1つの方法である．故障
モードの発生頻度から，影響の程度を定量的に表す致命度を用いてシステムの安全性
を評価する．FMEAと同様に，材料の損傷/破壊メカニズムを導き出すプロセスはなく，















































Fig. 2.1 Proposed failure mode analyses procedure caused by damage/fracture of materials retrieved from
deviation patterns in design specifications
次に修正 DRBFMの手順の詳細を示す．修正 DRBFMは，以下に示す 4つの手順から
成る．
• 手順 1. 仮想的な設計仕様の想定
• 手順 2. 設計仕様への偏差パターンの導入
• 手順 3. 設計仕様の偏差パターンに関連する材料の損傷/破壊モードの決定
34
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故障モードがもたらすリスクに対する方策を論理的に導出できる．
Fig. 2.2 Risk matrix for experiment
Table 2.1 Table2.1 Excerpt table used for failure mode analyses by damage/fracture of materials (a) Design
specifications table for material property and environmental conditions
36
2.2. 修正DRBFM (MODIFIED DRBFM) 37
Table2.1 Excerpt table used for failure mode analyses by damage/fracture of materials (b) Deviation
patterns in design specifications and changes in material properties
Table 2.1 Excerpt table used for failure mode analyses by damage/fracture of materials (c)
Association table between the deviation patterns with damage/fracture modes of materials
37
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Table 2.3 Retrieved damage/fracture modes, mechanisms by the groups of FMEA or modified DRBFM
42
2.3. 対物レンズを対象とした故障モード解析比較演習 43
Table 2.4 Comparison in the ratio of persons who could retrieve failure modes caused by damage/fracture
of materials
43
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Table 2.6 Rationality of relations from design specifications, damage/fracture mechanisms and failure



































































































従来故障モード解析手法には，HAZOP[22, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 106]，FMEA[22, 26, 28,























る為である [64, 65, 69]．但し，その様な検証方法はまだ確立されていない．
機械学習手法は，故障モードとそのメカニズムの決定に関する検証の強力なツールにな
る．ファジー集合論は，ファジー IF-THENルールの統計分析に基づいてリスク優先度数を推













トを提案する為に適用された [36, 42, 43]．サポートベクターマシン（SVM:Support Vector
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D = {di, ej} ; Design specifications
di, ej ∈ {−1, 0,+1} · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · (3.1)
di : Design variables as design specifications
= [0, 0, ...,−1, 0, ..., 1](1 × i)vector
ej : Environmental variables as design specifications
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Table 3.1 Deviation patterns for the design specifications and its sparse matrix expression
Design Design/Environmental Deviation patterns
specifications variables Excessive(+1) Normal range(0) Insufficient(-1)
Design Load amplitude Large(+1) Normal(0) Small(-1)
variables (di)
Magnitude of Large(+1) Normal(0) Small(-1)
static load
Material Major change(+1) Normal(0) Minor change(+1)
Shape Major change(+1) Normal(0) Minor change(+1)
Current/Voltage Large(+1) Normal(0) Small(-1)
Weight Large(+1) Normal(0) Small(-1)
Processing Method Major change(+1) Normal(0) Minor change(-1)
Assembly method Major change(+1) Normal(0) Minor change(-1)
Test method Major change(+1) Normal(0) Minor change(-1)
Environmental Temperature High(+1) Normal(0) Low(-1)
variables (e j) Humidity High(+1) Normal(0) Low(-1)
Vibration Large(+1) Normal(0) Small(-1)
Atomosphere pressure Large(+1) Normal(0) Small(-1)
Atomosphere gas type Large(+1) Normal(0) Small(-1)
Ultraviolet/Infrared/ High(+1) Normal(0) Low(-1)
Radiation
Static electricity High(+1) Normal(0) Low(-1)
Electromagnetic High(+1) Normal(0) Low(-1)
wave/Noise
Flow rate High(+1) Normal(0) Low(-1)
57




S = {σstress,k, φstrength,l} ; Stress-Strength model
σstress,k, φstrength,l ∈ {−1, 0,+1} · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · (3.2)
σstress,k : Stress factor variables
= [0, 0, ...,−1, 0, ..., 1](1 × k)vector
φstrength,l : Strength factor variables
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Table 3.2 Example of the deviation types for the stress/strength factors and the corresponding dam-
age/fracture modes of the materials
Stress-Strength model variables Damage modes Fracture modes




Compressive stress Compressive strength Deformation Buckling
Stress intensity
Fracture toughness Crack Stress corrosion
factor cracking
Stress amplitude
Fatigue strength Crack (Corrosion)
fatigue fracture
Thermal stress/
Creep limit Creep void Creep fracture
Average stress
Thermal stress/
Fatigue strength Crack (Corrosion)
Average stress fatigue fracture
Pressure Tensile strength Plastic deformation Ductile fracture
Pressure
Fracture toughness Crack Stress corrosion
cracking
Pressure






Object temperature Melting point Deformation Melting
Ambient temperature Melting point Deformation Melting
Ambient temperature Flash point Combustion Explosion
Solution concentration




Corrosion potential Corrosion potential Dissolution
insolution
Electric load
Dielectric strength Installation deterioration Dielectric
breakdown
Dose
Marginal dose Irradiation embrittlement (Irradiation)
brittle fracture
Particle size
Critical particle size Damage to living tissue Death of
living tissue
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Table 3.3 Example of the association table between the deviation patterns with the damage/fracture modes
Deviations of design Deviations of SSM Deviations of SSM Damage/Fracture
variables (di, e j) stress factors (σstress,k) strength factors (φstrength,l) modes (FMk)
High temperature (+1) High object Lower melting Deformation
temperature (+1) point (-1) (Damage mode)
Dissolution
(Fracture mode)
Low temperature (-1) Stress intensity Lower fracture Crack
factor (0) toughness (-1) (Damage mode)
Brittle fracture
(Fracture mode)
High humidity (+1) High potential Lower corrosion Corrosion
(+1) potential (-1) (Damage mode)
Dissolution
(Fracture mode)
Large vibration (+1) Large stress Lower fatigue Crack(Damage mode)
amplitude (+1) strength (-1) (Corrosion) fatigue
fracture(Fracture mode)
Large repetitive Large tensile stress/ Lower tensile Deformation
load (+1) residual stress (+1) strength (-1) (Damage mode)
Buckling
(Fracture mode)
Large vibration (+1) Large stress Lower fatigue Crack(Damage mode)
amplitude (+1) strength (-1) (Corrosion) fatigue
Large cyclic fracture(Fracture mode)
load (+1)
Large magnitude of Large stress Fatigue strength (0)
Crack(Damage mode)





Low temperature (-1) Stress intensity Lower fracture
Crack(Damage mode)




Major change Large residual Tensile strength (0) Deformation
of material (+1) stress (+1) (Damage mode)
Major change
Buckling







3つのグループに分けた（グループ 1：FMEA，グループ 2：DRBFM，グループ 3：設計偏
差法）．開発・設計・品質保証部門から合計 21人が比較演習に参加した．表 3.4に示す様
に，3つの方法の効果に関するアンケートも実施した．各質問は，「良くない」から「良
い」までの 5段階の範囲とした．平均スコアは，アンケートの回答を 1から 5までの範囲
で評価することで得られた（1：最低～5：最高）．質問の内容は，修正DRBFMの比較演
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Fig. 3.2 System of failure mode analysis target
Table 3.4 Questionnaire list of subjects interview
Questionnaire No. Questionnaire items
Q1 Does the exercise content seem to be useful for your work?
Q2 Is it possible to practice these exercises in your workplace?
Q3 Can you recommend the exercise content that would be used in the workplace?
Q4 Did you understand the content of the exercise?
Q5 Were the exercise examples appropriate?
Table 3.5 The information for each person’s major and work experience for each exercise group
Group name Major Work experience
DDM Chemistry, Product design,
FMEA Mechanical engineering, Production technology





• ステップ 1. 故障モード解析の対象項目と必要な機能の決定
• ステップ 2. 想定される故障モードの選択
• ステップ 3. 故障モードの影響とその影響度の評価
• ステップ 4. 故障モードの原因の想定
• ステップ 5. 故障モードの発生頻度の想定
• ステップ 6. 故障モードによる損害の重大度の想定
• ステップ 7. 故障モードのリスクレベルの決定
• ステップ 8. 故障モードのリスク低減方策の決定


























• ステップ 1. 故障モード解析の対象項目と必要な機能の決定
• ステップ 2. 想定される設計変更と環境変化の選択
• ステップ 3. 設計変更と環境変化からの故障モードの決定
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3.3. 仮想的なレーザ治療装置を対象とした故障モード解析比較演習 65
• ステップ 4. 故障モードのメカニズムの決定
• ステップ 5. 故障モードの原因の推定
• ステップ 6. 故障モードの発生の想定
• ステップ 7. 故障モードによる損傷の重大度評価
• ステップ 8. 故障モードのリスクレベルの決定
• ステップ 9. 故障モードのリスク低減方策の決定




























• ステップ 1. 設計偏差パターンの導出
• ステップ 2. SSM（応力/強度変数）偏差パターンの設定
• ステップ 3. 設計/SSM偏差パターン-材料の損傷/破壊モードの対応表作成
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3.4 SVMを用いた故障モード判別分析
SVMを用いた故障モード判別分析 [97, 98, 99]は，次の 5つのステップから成る．
• ステップ 1. 学習データの準備
• ステップ 2. 評価データの準備
• ステップ 3. 学習データと評価データを SVMに取り込む
• ステップ 4. SVMによって予測された材料の故障（損傷/破壊）モードを，故障モー
ド解析結果の故障（損傷/破壊）モードと比較する








ステップ 3. 学習データと評価データを SVMに取り込む












学習データは，材料強度学に関する文献 [5]より選定した表 3.3の合計 131条件とした．
評価データは，設計偏差法の故障モード解析より得られた合計 50の故障モード解析結
果とした．SVMのプログラムとして，統計解析言語 R3.4.2のマルチクラス判別 SVM関
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計偏差法対 FMEA t = 4.51（p = 0.0011），設計偏差法対DRBFM t = 5.49（p = 0.0009）），対
照的に，表 3.10として示している質問票の結果は，設計偏差法の詳細なプロセスに評価
者が従うことがやや困難であることを示唆した．
Table 3.6 Example of the failure mode analysis results (material-induced) in FMEA
Functions Failure modes Failure mechanisms Respondents
Supply power to Wiring resin Heat generation No.1
the laser oscillator deterioration of the power
Supply power to Destruction of Falling No.1
the laser oscillator housing ceramics
Generation of light Wiring resin Heat generation of No.1
deterioration the laser oscillator
Generation of light Destruction of Falling No.1
housing ceramics
Light transmitting Light does Split of the No.3
not transmit lenses
Light reflecting Light does Split of the No.3
not reflect lenses
Supply of laser Damage due to Failure of the No.5
light heat cooling system
70
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Table 3.7 Example of the failure mode analysis results (material-induced) in the DRBFM
Functions Failure modes Failure mechanisms Respondents
Light emission Deterioration of Aging deterioration No.1
the mirrors
Supply voltage Breakage of Reduced temperature resistance No.3
and current specification materials
Exit the laser Damage of the Reduced laser resistance No.3
lenses and mirrors
Light transmitting Split of the lenses Decrease in strength No.3
Supply voltage Breakage of Reduced temperature resistance No.3
and current specification materials
Energization Short circuit due to Unacceptable specification changes No.5
wiring temperature rise
Transmission Lenses deteriorate and Aging deterioration No.6
transmittance decreases
71
CHAPTER 3. 設計偏差法及び機械学習手法を用いた故障モード判別分析手法の提案 72
Table 3.8 Example of the failure mode analysis results (material-induced) in the DDM
Functions Failure modes Failure mechanisms Respondents
Vibration proof property Loss of vibration isolation Brittle fracture No.1
due to material damage
Insulation Loss of insulation function Fatigue fracture No.2
due to fatigue failure
Heat resistance Decrease in heat resistance Component changes No.3
due to composition change
Refraction Light does not refract as designed Heterogeneity of No.4
refractive index
Chemical resistance Loss of chemical resistance Fatigue fracture No.5
due to material failure
Load retention Poor retention due to lens damage Shock damage No.6
Transmission Non-uniform transmittance due Heterogeneity of No.7




Table 3.9 Determining the damage/fracture modes of the materials by the three methods
Respondents Determining the damage/fracture of the materials
FMEA DRBFM Design deviation method
No.1 11 2 12
No.2 0 2 9
No.3 3 0 26
No.4 0 0 12
No.5 1 1 12
No.6 0 2 21
No.7 5 2 15
Percentage of participants [%] 40.8 50.0 86.3∗
who could identify the mechanism
* p < 0.05
Table 3.10 Questionnaire results from the interview
Question No. Questionnaire results
FMEA DRBFM Design deviation method
Q1 3.00 ± 0.76 4.00 ± 0.53 3.71 ± 0.70
Q2 3.29 ± 0.45 3.43 ± 0.90 3.00 ± 0.53
Q3 2.86 ± 0.83 3.86 ± 0.83 3.14 ± 0.83
Q4 4.14 ± 0.35 4.57 ± 0.49 3.57 ± 0.90
Q5 3.14 ± 1.12 3.57 ± 0.73 4.14 ± 0.83
73
























Table 3.11 Failure mode discriminant analysis results by LIBSVM
Table 3.12 Classification of the damage/fracture modes using the SVM
Predicted failure Actual failure modes
modes (Corrosion) fatigue (Irradiation) brittle Stress corrosion
fracture fracture cracking
(Corrosion) fatigue fracture 22 0 0
(Irradiation) brittle fracture 0 2 0
Stress corrosion cracking 0 0 20
Melting 0 0 4
Penetration 0 0 2
75
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• 課題 1. 従来故障モード解析手法の論理を拡張し，材料に関する故障モード解析に
適用できる故障モード解析手法が構築されていない
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